"When you wake up and decide what clothes to put on in the morning, it seems abundantly obvious that you were the one who decided. You chose the beige corduroy pants and the green sweater, but had you felt just a little differently, you might have chosen the plaid skirt and the white turtleneck."

Well it *was* me that decided, not someone else, and had I felt differently I really could have picked something else to wear. That I'm likely fully determined to be who I am and want what I want doesn't detract from the causal efficacy of my character and desires in controlling my behavior. So determinism is no bar to agency, naturalistically conceived.

If, per impossibile, we had the power to decide what to do from some undetermined vantage point, we'd have no motive to choose one way or another. So all told there's no good reason to want to be free from cause and effect. Of course belief in contra-causal free will allows people to take ultimate credit and assign ultimate blame, but those aren't good grounds for denying determinism.

On this see "Don't forget about me: avoiding demoralization by determinism" at http://www.naturalism.org/demoralization.htm