Why Is Metacognition So Important for Good Thinking?

Most of my conversations about critical thinking (CT) inevitably refer, at some point, to its definition. This is an important trend because clarity is vital. Too often, discussions of this nature work on assumptions of an agreed definition and turn into disputes, simply because the people involved are unaware that they are speaking about different things. A useful analogy is an amended version of an old adage, where two people think they’re arguing over fruit, but one is really just talking about apples and the other about oranges. If they had just made it clear from the get-go what they were really talking about, their conversation might have been more "fruitful" (I know, I’m sorry).

So, when I discuss CT, I make it clear that it refers to the application of specific skills and dispositions that, through purposeful, self-regulatory judgment, facilitate enhanced decision-making and problem-solving. Broader though, CT is a metacognitive process. I always make a point of saying that because, to me anyway, that’s one of the clearest ways of describing it. However, it’s recently come to my attention that the metacognitive aspect rarely gets engaged in these conversations. People always seem more interested in the skills, dispositions, and the nature of self-regulated judgment. It’s perhaps my mistake to assume people always know what I mean by "metacognitive." Indeed, one recent conversation I had about CT actually did focus on metacognition and it was then that I realised that (1) I should not take such understanding for granted; and (2) such understanding is vital to gaining a more comprehensive understanding of CT.

Metacognition was first described by Flavell (1976) as “knowledge concerning one’s own cognitive processes and products or anything related to them; and the active monitoring, consequent regulation and orchestration of these processes”. According to Boekaerts and Simons (1993), Brown (1987), and Ku and Ho (2010), individuals think metacognitively in two ways: (1) with respect to awareness of their own cognitive processes (e.g. through self-monitoring or self-regulation); and (2) through the application of such processes for purposes of learning or devising solutions to problems (e.g. using CT or reflective judgment; Dawson, 2008). These concepts are also reflected in other, similar definitions of metacognition (e.g. see Demetriou, 2000; Osman & Hannafin, 1992; Sternberg, 1985; Weinert, 1987).

In its simplest form, metacognition can be conceptualised as "thinking about thinking" (Flavell, 1976, 1979). When we turn off the "stream of consciousness" meandering through our daily routines and pause to question ourselves or others, that’s metacognition at work. We use it when we need to regulate our thinking or review someone else’s, and we use it when we apply higher-order thinking in contexts that are important to us. Narratively speaking, metacognition is engaged when our thought processes recognise that some level of reflection is needed (e.g. is this true?, how does this make me feel?, how can I proceed from here) and/or when we choose to apply a specific cognitive approach in context (e.g. analysis, evaluation, inference, etc.; see Anderson & Krathwohl, 2001; Bloom at al., 1956; Dwyer, Hogan & Stewart, 2014). When we question the truth of some information, we might choose to further explore the truth. When an event or information elicits an emotion, we consider why we feel that way and account for it in our thinking. When we realise deeper consideration is necessary, we explore the various thinking approaches (CT or creative thinking) that might be used to progress (e.g. draw a conclusion or solve a problem). That’s a metacognition.

Just as CT takes time to develop (e.g. see Dwyer, 2017; Dwyer, Hogan & Stewart, 2012; 2015), likewise, metacognition isn’t something that can just be learned overnight. Sure, one can "learn" about what it is, but for it to be something we apply well on a regular basis, it takes time to develop. One of the better developmental perspectives on metacognition breaks the concept down into three components of "knowing." According to Kuhn (1999, 2000), metacognitive knowing is a type of declarative knowledge – the knowledge a person may possess in relation to cognition – that mental states exist, with personal metacognitive knowing referring to knowledge about one’s own mental states and impersonal metacognitive knowing referring to knowledge about others’ mental states. Metastrategic knowing involves procedural knowledge regarding cognitive processes, their availability, and their impact on performance and goal identification. Finally, epistemological knowing refers to an understanding of what ‘knowledge’ and’ knowing’ are, and how one comes to know.

The development of metacognition, as described above, is vital to the successful application of CT. Knowing situations that require CT is, of course, the first step to application. As above, a situation that makes us question truth or how it makes us feel, or that creates a kind of intellectual crossroads for us, is a tell-tale sign; but perhaps a simpler point is that we should apply CT when we encounter a topic we care about (Dwyer, 2023). Knowing what skills are necessary to apply, when, and how (i.e. analysis, evaluation, and inference) is also crucial for the application of CT. Finally, the development of epistemological knowing/understanding (i.e. understanding the nature of knowledge) is fundamental to CT, because it represents a foundation for knowing upon which we rest our evaluations and inferences (Dwyer, 2023).