The Psychology of Picking Up the Check

There ain't no such thing as a free dinner. —Crane’s Law (Bloch, 1977, adapted)

When groups of people, from 2 to N, go out to dinner, there is a potential for uncertainty and a mild stress response (McKersie, 1997). Who will pick up the check when it comes? Local culture provides some guidance so that diners won’t have to stress too much, but cultural norms and expectations are sometimes insufficiently clear, or they are violated by one diner or a subset of diners (Stouffer, 1949). Then what?

The normative expectations are clear enough when parents go out with their children (Hamilton, 1963). When heterosexual dating couples go out, there used to be greater clarity than there is now. Many married couples have gone past the point of tension and uncertainty by charging their joint account. If one person made it clear that he or she is the one inviting, we know that he or she will pay. Still, prior announcements of the “my treat” variety retain a potential of awkwardness. Communal sharing, when done well, does not require declarations of intent (Kameda et al., 2005).

When contemplating hypothetical scenarios, respondents tend to demand more information. How old are the diners? How much money do they make? Who paid last time? This is the data-science approach to uncertainty reduction. If we have all the relevant information, the thinking goes, there is no problem. We will know who should and will pay. No uncertainty, no stress. Alas, many social situations do not come with a spreadsheet of information to lead the way. Diners must rely on social norms as they understand them and tolerate the necessarily incomplete information they have about the party members and their history.

Let us consider a specific, if stylized, case. We have a party of six, as shown in the figure below. Joan and Jim are Lola and Sandy’s amicably divorced parents. Hal is Joan’s live-in partner, and Jack is Sandy’s live-in partner. The three older adults each have a professional income. The three young adults have more modest starting salaries. It is Hal’s presence that makes this case interesting. Without him, Joan and Jim would share the bill, no questions asked. Arguably, they would be on solid social-normative ground, and they have hewed to the simple rule of 50-50 splitting in the past. What of Hal? The three scenarios in the figure show possible breakdowns of the payment, but it should be noted that other distributions of financial responsibility are conceivable.

Payment scenarios for our party of six.

Source: J. Krueger

In Scenario 1, Joan and Jim split the bill equally as they always have. In Scenario 2, the three older adults pick up equal shares. In Scenario 3, Joan and Hal act as a unit, splitting one half of the bill, while Jim pays the other half. Reasonable people may disagree on what should be expected to happen in such a situation, what they think will happen, and how they would feel about each of the scenarios when simulating each diner’s unique perspective.

Let us consider some possibilities. Scenario 1 leaves Hal in a delicate position. Is he being treated like a child (young adult) by getting a free pass? Will he be happy about not having to pay, or will he be embarrassed by the prospect of being seen as powerless? How would Jim feel about splitting the bill with his ex-spouse when another older adult is present? Would Joan be indifferent? Scenario 2 is equitable for the three older diners, but might Hal feel he did more than he should? After all, the young adults are not his children. Would Scenario 3 allay these concerns? If so, would Jim grouse at a perceived inequity disfavoring him?

The situation is complicated by another social norm, a norm that states one should rather not discuss perceived financial inequities—if there are such perceptions. If one or more parties feel short-changed, the emotional response has nowhere to go. On the one hand, reasonable people ought to be able to find a solution all can agree on; on the other hand, reasonable people know that such conversations are to be avoided.

We may suspect that many readers have experienced a version of this awkward kind of situation. What advice might psychologists offer? Since there does not seem to be a golden key to unlock the secret of communal happiness, let us review some options.

First, there is, of course, the option of frank and open discussion among the elders. This could happen before or after dinner, but arguably not during. A barrier to such a conversation is that whoever initiates it is likely cast in the role of the aggrieved party, which entails a loss of power and prestige.

Second, there is the option of withdrawal. If one diner feels taken advantage of, this person could opt out of participation in future dinners. This move would be tantamount to a refusal to further engage with freeloaders and defectors (Balliet & Lindström, 2023). However, this move brings considerable risks, especially to the parents in our scenario, for obvious reasons. As a consequence, Hal’s hand is strengthened.

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A third and a fourth option are respectively to suck it up or to blow it up. Needless to say, the projected emotional and interpersonal costs are considerable.

What makes this seemingly simple scenario compelling and difficult is that evolved capacities for communal sharing are ill-aligned with the modern family. Communal sharing emerged in hunter-gatherer societies where nuclear families were not encapsulated and where the availability of food could vary dramatically with luck, changing seasons, the migrations of prey animals, and the whims of the gods. In the short run, hunter-gatherers will point out, everyone gets fed, and in the long run, no one gets exploited (Suzman, 2017).

Meanwhile, down at the neighborhood family restaurant, blood pressures are still on the rise. A digestif for everyone can ease the tension – especially if it is on the house.

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