I've always liked Graziano's theory. In particular, I like his approach, which is to note that our knowledge of our own experience has to be modeled somewhere, and that knowledge literally *is* that model, and so is only as good as the model. I do think he tends to promote it a bit too much as the one answer rather than part of the answer, albeit possibly a crucial one.

On illusionism, my take is that the illusionists are right ontologically, but their insistence on using the word "illusion", I think, causes more problems than it solves. Graziano noted that when people hear the word "illusion", they perceive "mirage." That's not what most illusionists mean, and so they end up spending a lot of time clarifying.

I think there's a lot to the argument that if experience is an illusion, then the illusion is the experience. It seems more productive to view consciousness as an emergent phenomenon (in the weak sense of emergence) rather than a fake one.

Enjoyed the write up Ralph, as always!