Asperger's Syndrome
Reading Asperger in the 'Reading the Mind in the Eyes' Test
Results of a classic test for autism reflect Asperger’s concept of the disorder.
Posted February 21, 2016
A recent study reports that a classic measure of mentalizing ability to which I have referred in previous posts, the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET), reveals two discrete groups among subjects diagnosed with an autism spectrum condition (ASC). The first group shows clear difficulty on the RMET, with a significant deficit when compared to non-autistic controls. In contrast, the second group shows little to no difficulty on the RMET compared to controls. These ASC subgroups are not systematically different across a range of other variables including sex, age, depression, or anxiety symptoms, autistic traits, empathy, and severity of autism symptoms. Verbal IQ is slightly lower in the impaired ASC subgroup, but this does not explain the difference.
The unimpaired subgroup consists of a majority of ASC adults (67 to 85%) who show little or no consistent deficit in mentalizing as measured by the RMET. The impaired subgroup, in contrast, "consists of only a small subset of ASC adults (15 to 33%)." The researchers add that “In the context of standard case-control studies that look for on-average group differences, it is clear that this small subset is primarily driving the effects observed in adults on the RMET.”

That a small subset of more impaired autistics can distort our understanding of autism in adults is strongly reminiscent of what we now know happened when autism was first discovered. For 70-odd years we have believed that Leo Kanner in Baltimore and Hans Asperger in Vienna (left) discovered autism independently in the late 1930s. Inevitably, Kanner’s description dominated, with Asperger’s works remaining un-translated and ignored until the 1980s, when the English child psychiatrist, Lorna Wing, (among others) rediscovered them. As a result, Kanner’s description of autism became the equivalent of the impaired group above, while Asperger’s syndrome defined high-functioning autism corresponding to the unimpaired group.
Certainly, Kanner’s concept of autism was far more restrictive than was Asperger’s, and was based on just 13 cases (11 described in his original paper, plus 2 mentioned in footnotes), while Asperger’s cases numbered more than 200. As a recent account puts it, Kanner
was sitting at the apex of a pyramid designed to filter all but the most profoundly disabled children of the most well-connected families in America out of his caseload. From this rarefied perspective, it’s not surprising that his syndrome seemed both exceptionally rare and strikingly monolithic. ... What’s more surprising is how far Kanner was willing to go to ensure that other researchers saw his syndrome as exceptionally rare and monolithic too, even after evidence to the contrary began to emerge. (p. 194)
Asperger, by contrast, reported that autistic children represented “a particularly interesting and recognizable type of child.” He came to believe that they were representative of a distinct syndrome that was “not at all rare,” as the recent “autism epidemic” has proved. Indeed, although “the spectrum model of autism and the concept of neuro-diversity are widely believed to be products of our postmodern world, they turn out to be old ideas, proposed by Hans Asperger in his first public lecture on autism in 1938.” (p. 16)
Where Asperger saw threads of genius and disability inextricably intertwined in his patients’ family histories—testifying to the complex genetic roots of their condition and the “social value of this personality type,” as he put it—Kanner saw the shadow of the sinister figure that would become famous in popular culture as the “refrigerator mother.” … By blaming parents for inadvertently causing their children’s autism, Kanner made his syndrome a source of shame and stigma for families worldwide while sending autism research off in the wrong direction for decades. (p. 188)
We now know that Kanner must almost certainly have learnt about Asperger’s work from two of the latter’s close colleagues who travelled to the USA and were married there in 1937. They joined Kanner’s clinic in Baltimore in April of the following year—1938, from which Kanner’s first cases of autism are dated. These new associates of Kanner’s were the psychologist, Anni Weiss, and Georg Frankl, who had been no less a person than Asperger’s chief diagnostician.
According to the account I am quoting, “This crucial link between the two pioneers of autism has escaped the attention of historians until now, mostly because Kanner studiously avoided mentioning it.” (pp. 167-8) Unlike Asperger himself, who cited Kanner on a number of occasions, sometimes in glowing terms, Kanner never acknowledged Asperger’s contributions to the field. Nor did the two men meet when Asperger visited the United States in the 1970s. Indeed, another writer reports that Michael Fitzgerald “believes this might have been a sign of Kanner’s ‘embarrassment’ at having ‘plagiarized’ his work.” (p. 12)
These recent revelations sent me back to Asperger’s original works, and made me realize, not only to what a degree Kanner had obscured and distorted Asperger’s revolutionary findings in his attempt to shoehorn them into conventional thinking, but also to what an extent Asperger makes sense of everything we have learnt about autism in recent years. Certainly, where the imprinted brain theory is concerned, Asperger was emphatic that autism was a genetically-determined—even "polygenetic"—condition, and rightly pointed out that the "psychological approach confuses cause and effect." And as to the diametric model of mental illness, his insistence that autistics are not psychotic and that "the autistic personality is neither biologically nor genetically related to schizophrenia"* would have saved psychiatry from a chronic confusion which began with Kanner and which still bedevils it today.
Finally, and to return to RMET, Asperger was aware from the beginning that there is much more to the role of the eyes in mentalism than simply inferring emotion:
From the first when an infant can properly “look,” that is, from the third month of life, and well before there is any verbal expression, the majority of his social relations are based on eye gaze. How the small child drinks in the world with his eyes! … With our children here there is a fundamental difference. Hardly ever does their glance fix brightly on a particular object or person as a sign of lively attention and contact. One can never be sure whether their glance goes into the far distance or is turned inwards, just as one never knows what the children are preoccupied with at a particular moment or what is going on in their minds. The disturbance is particularly clear when they are in conversation with others. Glance does not meet glance as it does when unity of conversational contact is established. When we talk to someone we do not only “answer” with words, but we “answer” with our look, our tone of voice and the whole expressive play in face and hands. A large part of social relationships is conducted through eye gaze, but such relationships are of no interest to the autistic child.*
Read with these words and Asperger’s inclusive and expansive concept of autism in mind, the fact that the majority of autistic subjects are unimpaired according to RMET results is nothing like the paradox it might seem. On the contrary, it is yet another finding that argues for Asperger's original insight and against Kanner's ersatz emulation of it.
*Asperger, H. 'Autistic psychopathy' in childhood. in Autism and Asperger syndrome 37-92 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991).