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How Should We Approach the Problem of Misinformation?

An examination of the findings concerning the problem of misinformation.

Key points

  • A recent study showed that 69 percent of people treat misinformation as information that is intentionally designed to mislead.
  • There is considerable work showing that people are more aware that information is false than they are given credit for.
  • Psychology has struggled to reliably show a direct causal association between attitudes/beliefs and behaviour.

Do we all take misinformation to mean the same thing?

The answer is no. If we look at different disciplines examining the topic, we don’t see a wholesale agreement (Adams et al., 2022). That said, most academic communities make a general distinction between unintentionally communicating false or inaccurate information (e.g., Qazvinian et al., 2011; Van der Meer & Jin, 2019) from intentionally communicating false or inaccurate information (Levi, 2018).

In a recent survey (Osman et al., 2022) from a large sample (N= 4407), the findings revealed that most people (69 percent) treat misinformation as information that is intentionally designed to mislead.

For the sake of argument, let’s agree that communicating information that is false/inaccurate isn’t a good thing, and even more problematic if it is done deliberately. However, in the latter case, it is hard to claim intentions behind communication without good evidence, else we veer into accusations of being conspiratorial. So, to be on safe side, the next thing to consider is where we encounter false/inaccurate information, the volume of false/inaccurate information that is out there, and the effects it might have on our behaviour.

So, is the internet rife with misinformation?

In a recent review, Altnay et al.'s (2021a) likely response would be no. One such example they use to support this is by Majid (2021). The findings here suggest that from March 2019 to 2020, traffic to trustworthy websites increased by two billion websites compared to an increase in 30 million additional views to untrustworthy websites; though the estimates could be challenged.

Also, the typical source of news in the US (as an example) is still consumed via television, five times more than other sources, with fake news comprising approximately 0.15 percent of Americans’ daily media diet, Allen et al. (2020).

Since we also know that news media can get details wrong sometimes (Bachman, 2017; Maier, 2007; Myers & Russell, 2019), it worth pointing out that there is no analysis regarding the volume of false/inaccurate information presented via television media compared to other sources, though one would hope this is considerably less given that new media have standards to comply with.

Does false/inaccurate information spreads faster than true/accurate information?

Even if there is less of it about that is encountered, it would still be a problem if it spread more intensely. A problem here is methodological issues that limit any confident claims made about the massive spread of misinformation. For example, Altnay et al. (2021a) highlight that sampling bias accounted in part for findings reported in an influential study by Vosoughi et al. (2018). It showed that falsehoods reached people six times faster than true news stories.

Vosoughi et al. (2018), by their own admission, examined the spread of true and false news online but of “contested news” based on what fact-checkers had classified as true or false. But, we also know that fact-checkers themselves can be face difficulty in reliably determining what is true. Also, there are concerns regarding the level of independence fact-checking organisations have from the institutions that they are designed to fact check (Graves & Cherubini, 2016; Moshirnia, 2020).

Do people believe false/inaccurate information they come across?

The answer is not always. There is considerable work showing that people are more aware that information is false than they are given credit for. But, we could consider that if they do come across false/inaccurate information and spread it, then they can do so wittingly.

So, is this a problem? Perhaps, but we also need to take into account that when people encounter false/inaccurate information they share it for a variety of reasons that include: amusement, to socialize, to express skepticism, outrage or anger, and/or to signal group membership (Adams et al., 2022; Altnay et al., 2021b; Waruwu et al., 2021).

The point here is that even if people encounter false/inaccurate information, and then share it, they don't exclusively do this because they want to promote false/inaccurate claims.

Does a greater proportion of misinformation lead to an increase in harmful behaviours?

The jury is still out on this (Adams et al., 2022), and it is worth considering why this is the case. First, order matters. It isn’t necessarily the case that misinformation generates a new belief that leads to aberrant behaviour (Guess et al., 2021). People find information that is consistent with their prior beliefs (which is an example of confirmation bias), which, in and of itself can be a significant problem, but it is a generic problem, and not one that is specific to the current live issue of misinformation.

That all said, regardless of order, then the next crucial evidence should still show that misinformation causes the uptake of false/inaccurate beliefs and that these directly cause harmful behaviour. But, again, we face a general issue, which is that psychology has struggled to reliably show a direct causal association between attitudes/beliefs and behaviour.

To overcome methodological difficulties, proxies for behaviour, such as intentions to behave a certain way, are measured in replace of behaviour itself, though this isn’t ideal because we don't always do as we intend. Where there are studies that show a causal association between attitudes/beliefs and actual behaviour, it is weakly demonstrated, and often explained by other moderating factors (e.g., personality, incentives, goals, persuasiveness of communication) (for examples, see Adams et al., 2022)

What can we conclude from this?

To answer the title question, the collective approach (and the level of corrective action) to false/inaccurate information should be proportionate to the level of certainty we have about the effects of it, and the causes of it. Accurate estimates based on empirical studies both for and against the alarm regarding the volume of false/inaccurate information are still left wanting.

Valid and reliable evidence regarding the harmful behaviours false/inaccurate information causes still needs to be gathered, because precise measurement is required to determine what false/inaccurate information is the cause of a particular aberrant behaviour.

Finally, while the populous isn’t immune from encountering or spreading false/inaccurate information, neither are the institutions that are tasked with providing us with the truth. So, given all of this, it appears that we need to dedicate more efforts to making sure we get a good evidence base together to then carefully determine what needs to be done about the problem of misinformation.

References

Adams, Z., Osman. M., Bechlivanidis, C., & Meder, B. (2022). (Why) Is misinformation a problem? https://psyarxiv.com/xvhbs/

Allen, J., Howland, B., Mobius, M., Rothschild, D., & Watts, D. J. (2020). Evaluating the fake news problem at the scale of the information ecosystem. Science Advances, 6(14), eaay3539.

Altay, S., Berriche, M., & Acerbi, A. (2021a). Misinformation on misinformation: Conceptual and methodological challenges. https://psyarxiv.com/edqc8

Altay, S., de Araujo, E., & Mercier, H. (2021b). “If this account is true, it is most enormously wonderful”: Interestingness-if-true and the sharing of true and false news. Digital Journalism. https://doi.org/10.1080/21670811.2021.1941163

Bachman, J. (2017). The new york times and washington post: Misleading the public about US drone strikes. Journalism Studies, 18(4), 470-494.

Graves, L., & Cherubini, F. (2016). The rise of fact-checking sites in Europe.

Guess, A., Lockett, D., Lyons, B., Montgomery, J. M., Nyhan, B., & Reifler, J. (2020). “Fake news” may have limited effects beyond increasing beliefs in false claims. Harvard Kennedy School Misinformation Review, 1(1).

Levi, L. (2018). Real “fake news” and fake “fake news”. First Amendment Law Review, 16, 232.

Maier, S. R. (2007). Setting the record straight: When the press errs, do corrections follow?. Journalism Practice, 1(1), 33-43.

Majid, A. (2021). Covid-19 and the rise of misinformation and misunderstanding. PressGazette. https://www.pressgazette.co.uk/covid-19-rise-in-news-misinformation-dat…

Moshirnia, A. (2020). Who Will Check the Checkers? False Factcheckers and Memetic Misinformation. Utah L. Rev., 1029.

Myers, C., & Russell, K. (2019). Image repair in the aftermath of inaccurate polling: How the news media responded to getting it wrong in 1948 and 2016. Journal of Political Marketing, 18(1-2), 148-177.

Osman. M., Adams, Z., Meder, B., Bechlivanidis, C., Verduga, O., & Strong, C. (2022). People’s understanding of the concept of misinformation. Journal of Risk Research.

Qazvinian, V., & Rosengren, E., Radev, D. & Mei, Q. (2011). Rumor has it: Identifying misinformation in microblogs. Proceedings of the 2011 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing, 1589-1599.

Van Der Meer, T. & Jin, Y. (2019). Seeking formula for misinformation treatment in public health crises: The effects of corrective information type and source. Health Communication, 35(5), 560-575.

Vosoughi, S., Roy, D., & Aral, S. (2018). The spread of true and false news online. Science, 359(6380), 1146–1151.

Waruwu, B. K., Tandoc Jr, E. C., Duffy, A., Kim, N., & Ling, R. (2021). Telling lies together? Sharing news as a form of social authentication. New Media & Society, 23(9), 2516-2533.

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