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In this post I would like to continue the discussion of the central functions – or faculties – of the mind, moving from the process of identity (or relationally-constituted self), discussed in the previous post, to the process of the will.
Identity, which is the agent of a particular culture, does not issue commands to the brain directly; it does so through the “structure” of human agency, will, or acting self, the creation of culture in general. Human beings are carriers of will and discretion; they are -- each one of them, if normal -- independent actors in the sense of being capable of action and not just reaction, whose actions (except involuntary reflexes) are products of decision and choice. This will is a function of symbols -- to operate with these intentional, thus arbitrary, signs, we internalize the principle of their intentionality; the will, therefore, like identity, is logically implied in the symbolic reality of the mind. When reacting to a cue, whether externally or internally generated (for instance, the election of a new president or a spontaneously firing nerve that triggers a memory-recall of an unpleasant incident at a doctor’s office), we are capable of voluntarily interrupting the ensuing mental process, saying to ourselves, for example: “I don’t want to think about this now,” “I do not want to react to this in such-and-such a way,” and thereby of shaping our response. It is to this intermediate stage between stimulus and reaction/action, in which, for humans, the nature of response is still indeterminate and must be decided that the word “consciousness” is frequently applied.
Moreover, humans are capable of independently, i.e., at will, generating cues and starting mental processes. For instance a person may say to oneself: “I want to remember such and such episode” or “I want to begin thinking about such and such subject,” and thereby start the process of memory recall or manipulation. Humans are not genetically forced to want almost anything -- perhaps to evacuate and to sleep -- every other genetic imposition, including hunger, sexual desire, and pain, can be resisted by the will. How do we acquire binding volitions, i.e. desires which compel us to act?
The mind must include “structures” -- mechanisms capable of blocking the biological information the brain generates, when this information interferes with the processing or creating symbolic information. More generally, it must contain mechanisms which, for every event, select the “operative logic” (or logics) appropriate to the context, while suppressing other “logics.” The will, or agency, or acting self – that part of our mind that makes decisions, is such a structure or set of mechanisms. What does the will do, specifically? It arbitrates in cases of contradictory stimuli. Most often, such arbitrage is unconscious and involves no effort (of will) on our part: we simply receive, and obey, an instruction to follow a particular logic. If a consciousness can be equated with a particular symbolic logic, we all necessarily develop multiple consciousnesses and, depending on the occasion, skillfully select among them the appropriate one.
But will’s arbitrage may involve a conscious effort, and it is for the cases when it does that the language – at least, in the West – reserves the concept of the “will.” For instance, one may be tired and wish to lie down, but have unfinished work, in which case the will will instruct the organism: “You will pay no attention to your fatigue, but will be guided by the logic demanding you to finish the work you have started.” Late in the evening, however, it will issue a different instruction: “You will now lay down your work, though unfinished, and take care of your fatigue, (because otherwise you won’t be able to continue your work tomorrow)”. Or, in the case of a soldier fearing for his life, the will may declare: “The logic you will obey at present is that of a collective military enterprise. Therefore, you will expose your life to danger and disregard the survival instinct which instructs you to run away and hide.” It is in regard to such choices that we talk of the “free will.” By definition, the will is free: it is always up to the human agency, to the (acting) self to decide which symbolic tack to take. Everything else in a person may cry against a certain action, and yet the person’s will, the agency, will impose itself and the person will do its bidding. We refer to that will as a “strong” one, which systematically imposes on the person the ‘logic’ considered to be more difficult to follow. Of course, what is so considered changes with the context.
Symbolic imagination is travel over the links of various “logical” chains. Will, agency or (acting) self is the mechanism for making choices or decisions. We are able to deploy our imaginative capacities correctly, namely, in accordance with the appropriate symbolic “logic” thanks to the arbitrage of the will, while the will’s arbitrage, much as our capacity to learn and memorize, is mediated by identity (the relationally-constituted self). Clearly, it would be much easier for a person unambiguously self-defined as a soldier to risk his life in the face of mortal danger, rather than try to save himself; his identity will, in effect, screen the logic of self-preservation from him, making him, so to speak, “single-minded” in his sharp awareness of the dictates of proper soldierly conduct. A person unsure of whether being a soldier is really “him,” in contrast, will be much more likely to hesitate and run for cover. Problems with identity impair the will, making the person indecisive and unmotivated, while an impaired will interferes with routine functioning of symbolic imagination.
The will/agency/acting self is the function of the autonomy of human consciousness -- i.e., the mind’s independence from the natural environment and from learning and memory related to the natural environment, the mind’s being self-sustained, which makes possible a multitude of desires -- and of identity (or relationally-constituted self), which represents to the individual his/her options. Thus, it is the expression of subjectivity. There is no subjectivity in animals, unless these are pets, even though, given the nature of learning and memory, every rat’s and certainly every monkey’s brain is unique, and there is individuality in monkeys and rats. But because monkeys and rats do not have choices, the uniqueness of every animal’s brain does not give rise to subjectivity, and there is no need in agency, will, and self. However unique, the knowledge and action/reaction of a rat or a monkey are objective (shared by others within the species), making every rat or monkey a representative of all rats or all monkeys.
One can speculate about the system in the brain that supports the will. Perhaps, it is neurons similar to those that make possible in rats the perception of the stimuli which require an adaptive reaction, transmitting to other neurons the command: “do this or that,” neurons whose function it is to sense desires imposed on animals by their genes, but in us culturally constructed and mediated by consciousness and structures of the self (even though not necessarily consciously mediated: a person is not always fully aware of what he or she wants). Whatever that brain system, culture determines the individual’s likes and dislikes, programming the brain to will certain things -- programming the will, like the rat’s “will” -- i.e., rat -- is programmed genetically. Identity presents to the individual the possibilities for the given historical time, helping to establish their subjective ranking: because you are what you are (a Catholic or a Muslim, a wife or a soldier, a member of the aristocracy or a registered Democrat) you must will this and not this. It commands the will what to choose and to decide. In every specific case the will and the identity are determined by culture. The vast majority of the records or representations in memory are also determined by culture -- the contents of memory, thus, the raw material of the imagination, are culture-given. What is done to these records in the brain (i.e., how they are manipulated) depends both on the brain and the organization principles of the particular symbolic system(s). But cultural selection -- i.e., the social success of some imaginings and the failure of others depends exclusively on the historical context, that is, again, on culture. It is important to keep in mind that, unlike natural selection, cultural selection does not weed out imaginings not selected for success at a certain historical moment: they are not killed, but only left latent. In changed historical circumstances or in the presence of a genius there is always the possibility that these temporarily unselected imaginings will have their day.
Liah Greenfeld is the author of Mind, Modernity, Madness: The Impact of Culture on Human Experience
