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How Presidents Think

A team at the University of California at Berkeley has gone beyond groupthink to GDQS, or Group Dynamics Q Sort, a model of group behavior that could indicate in advance which regimes are likely to make disastrous decisions and which are on an enlightened path.

THE YEAR WAS 1972: God was in Heaven, Nixon was in the White House, and psychologist Irving Janis was in the lab. While Nixon plotted the fateful Watergate cover-up, Janis was developing a theory to explain how the political decisions of those in power are made. His theory -"groupthink" - said that the social dynamics within a leadership group might result in faulty, even disastrous, political decisions. Nixon soon became groupthink's poster child.

Twenty years later, there's a more sophisticated model for scrutinizing the decision-making process of those in power. A team at the University of California at Berkeley has gone beyond groupthink to GDQS, or Group Dynamics Q Sort, a model of group behavior that could indicate in advance which regimes are likely to make disastrous decisions and which are on an enlightened path.

As Janis described his theory for Psychology Today in 1971, groupthink always leads to faulty decisions because it is the result of a desire for conformity and concurrence within the leadership group - at the expense of critical and objective thinking. His prime example was the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba. The cohesiveness and esprit de corps of the Kennedy White House actually had the effect of suppressing "dissident" ideas, or any objective scrutiny.

Janis' theory received enormous attention, but key aspects troubled researchers. It was retrospective. And, some claimed, it examined only historical cases that would support the theory.

Philip Tedock, Ph.D., a social psychologist at Berkeley, decided to test the supposed examples of groupthink using a new method. He came up with 100 pairs of questions that sharply delineated crucial group processes -leader strength, rigidity, democratic accountability, pessimism, conformity, factionalism, and task orientation. Using the set of 100 questions (e.g. "The group leader is insulated from criticism" versus "The group is exposed to a wide range of views and arguments"), experts assess dynamics unbiased by anyone's assumptions.

Tetlock chose 10 political leadership groups - including the Carter Iran hostage-rescue attempt - that Janis had examined. From historical writings he prepared case studies. Then assessors applied the GDQS questions.

In some cases, there were high scores on the factionalism, democratic accountability, or pessimism scales, indicating that the group was "vigilant," the opposite of groupthink.

"Janis was right in assuming that group dynamics affect decision-making," says Tetlock "But he probably exaggerated the severity of groupthink." Tetlock disputes the notion that group processes necessarily result in bad decision - or that "vigilant" groups always come up with good ones. On Carter's attempted hostage rescue, the GDQS revealed the group quite vigilant. The process was right; the outcome a disaster.

By Tetlock's analysis, the Salinas government bodes well for Mexico's future. "The previous governments were more corrupt and oligarchic, but the Salinas group is well-informed and open to alternative approaches." North Korea, on the other hand, has a prime case of "absolutism." Don't look for progress anytime soon.

Currently, Tedock is applying the GDQS to American politics, particularly George Bush's response to the Persian Gulf crisis.