Penn State football coach Joe Paterno was fired yesterday after a career that spanned over 40 years. He reported information about sexual abuse by one of his assistant coaches, Jerry Sandusky, to his athletic director and a vice president of Penn State, thereby fulfilling his legal and/or university obligations. The Penn State Board of Trustees apparently thought that Paterno (and the University President, Graham Spanier) should have done more, and they fired them. Paterno's firing apparently spurred loyal Penn State students to riot in their protests of his ouster.
We don't know all the facts of the case, and I take no position on the guilt, innocence, or moral culpability of any of the parties involved. My goals in this post are simply to help us begin (a) to understand the scandal from multiple perspectives by applying some psychological principles, (b) to understand some psychology by using aspects of this case as examples, and (c) to appreciate the complexity of ethical and moral choices we are all called upon to make. In this post I present some initial musings; it is not a comprehensive exploration of the behavior of all the parties involved.
Ethical Dilemmas
Paterno, Penn State students, the graduate assistant who reported the abuse, the Board of Trustees, all faced ethical choices and dilemmas. Making choices involves weighing competing principles, feelings, and values. For example, Paterno's affection for, and loyalty to, his assistant Sandusky may have blunted his moral outrage and influenced his perceptions of the information he received. Students' appreciation for Paterno's history of winning and other good deeds may influence their views about whether firing was too harsh. Deliberating about our moral responsibilities in the face of emotional and other "nonrational factors" (Rogerson et al., 2011) can be very difficult. It is often not as simple as saying that somebody is a good or bad person. We know from years of research that people overestimate the degree to which behaviors are due to stable personality characteristics rather than situational factors. This phenomenon is so well-known that it has a name: the fundamental attribution error.
We can look at Paterno's choices and behaviors in terms of Positive Ethics, the idea that professionals strive to uphold the highest values of their profession rather than merely doing the minimum required or managing risk. Paterno did what he needed to do to stay out of legal trouble; indeed, he has not been indicted. But did he do all he could or should have done? Apparently the Board of Trustees thought not. Some of us may also condemn Paterno for not doing more, but would we have acted any differently? There is some research evidence that professionals, such as psychologists, may not do what they know would be best under all circumstances (e.g., Bernard, Murphy, & Little, 1987). Even if we think of ourselves as good, moral, ethical people, there are often pressures—both internal and external—that make it very difficult to act in exemplary ways all the time.
One related dilemma psychologists and other mental health professionals often face is the legal obligation to report suspected child abuse committed by their clients. The evidence suggests that some psychologists who suspect clients of abusing their children may not fulfill their legal obligations to report; they may be influenced by feelings of loyalty to their clients, overly optimistic judgments of their own ability to reduce incidents of abuse, lack of confidence in the authorities, and other factors.
Idiosyncrasy Points and Power
Why are students and others so upset at Paterno's firing? One message students may be sending is, "If you are a good enough coach and public figure for a long enough time, you are allowed to be less morally vigilant, active, and culpable in protecting vulnerable children." One wonders whether a 5-year coach with a .500 winning percentage might have been the subject of student protests calling for his ouster.
We know that moral condemnation and punishments are not always equitable. Hollander (1986) discussed the concept of idiosyncrasy points, which refers to the leeway granted to some members of a group by virtue of their history of abiding by group norms. One of my favorite examples of idiosyncrasy points comes from the late 1980's, when two Democratic members of Congress, Jim Wright and Barney Frank, were the subject of scandals. Jim Wright was forced to resign, while Barney Frank remained in the House of Representatives. The cases were complex and different, but one factor in Frank's survival appears to be that he was liked by his Democratic colleagues, who regarded him as a very knowledgeable, skilled, and helpful political strategist. Thus, he had built up idiosyncrasy points that may have influenced perceptions of his moral culpability.
Paterno has built up enormous reservoirs of good will, good deeds, good feelings—in other words, idiosyncrasy points. One could argue that this allows him some moral wiggle room, and it seems that's the position students (and others) are taking. The Board of Trustees, however, may have felt that the sexual abuse that occurred was so severe that even the massive idiosyncrasy points Paterno had accumulated were not enough to offset his obligations to follow up on his reporting.
Another way to frame the case is in terms of power, which is part of most ethical discussions. Clearly (although allegedly), Sandusky abused the power he held over children. Paterno had enough power—by virtue of his position and his longevity—to do things such as fire Sandusky. Thus, it could be argued that he should have exercised that power. People with little or no power can be forgiven for not blowing the whistle because they face reprisals. Doing right moral things in the face of such personal risk is hard to do, and those who are successful are often seen as ethically excellent, even heroes. Paterno's power, in the form of idiosyncrasy points, may have made him appear less blameworthy in the eyes of some. However, his poewr may cause others to perceive him as having had the means, and thus the obligation, to take more definitive and effective action.
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Mitch Handelsman is a professor of psychology at the University of Colorado Denver and the co-author (with Sharon Anderson) of Ethics for Psychotherapists and Counselors: A Proactive Approach (Wiley-Blackwell, 2010).
References:
Bernard, J. L., Murphy, M., & Little, M. (1987). The failure of clinical psychologists to apply understood ethical principles. Professional Psychology: Research and Practice, 18, 489-491.
Hollander, E. P. (1986). The idiosyncrasy credit model of leadership. Encyclopedia of Leadership. Stuttgart, Germany: Poeschel.
Rogerson, M. D., Gottlieb, M. C., Handelsman, M. M., Knapp, S., & Younggren, J. (2011). Nonrational processes in ethical decision making. American Psychologist, 66, 614-623.
© 2011 Mitchell M. Handelsman. All Rights Reserved
