Dr. Barrett responded with commentaries, which I appreciate. He notes that he did not intend to assert that belief can self-reinforce. He notes that he "certainly never argued that if one simply believes in something then that something is more likely to exist." It is good to have this out of the way. What is it that he does assert, and how do I feel about it? I will quote from his comments (in italics) and reply. The full text of his comments can be found on the sites of my earlier posts.

Barrett: I argue that if someone believes something due to natural cognitive dispositions (or intuitions) they need not justify that belief until there is reason to suspect it. It is innocent until proven guilty. Hence, the theist (of this sort) does not have to marshal an argument for their belief but the opponent needs to marshal an argument against it. This doesn't make God's existence more probable but does mean that a theist is justified in some of their beliefs until reasons or evidence arises that upset their position.

Krueger: Science has a "show-me" epistemology. If you make a claim, you need to present evidence to support it. Better yet, show that the claim or hypothesis survived attempts at refutation. The burden of proof is on you. To shift the burden to the skeptic is convenient. It lets you say "I believe X and unless you can prove to me that X is false, I will continue to believe in X." This is an appeal to ignorance (ad ignorantiam), which is a weak strategy because it invites a proliferation of beliefs. I believe there is one universe, you believe there are two, Joey believes there are three, Monica believes there are four, and so on. It seems like a waste of time. The phrase "due to natural cognitive dispositions" introduces a constraint. Research in cognitive psychology suggests that people readily attribute mental states and agency to others. This natural cognitive disposition also makes them "see" moving dots on a screen as acting with purpose, chasing one another, pulling others along etc. The perception fits the instinct and yet what we see is a false alarm. The moving dots are not sentient. Is the belief in a desiring, intending, and planning deity a false alarm, as many cognitivists suggest, or is it a justifiable belief because no one can prove that it is a false alarm? If science is concerned with the study of the natural world, and if the substance of theism is supernatural, why should we bring the discourse of science to the question of whether particular beliefs are justified?

Barrett: If a particular theological belief proved to be completely incompatible with indisputable conditions in the natural world, then that would constitute evidence against the theological belief. If two theological beliefs proved to be contradictory, that too would count against one or both beliefs.

Krueger: It is easy to think of "theological beliefs that proved to be completely incompatible with indisputable conditions in the natural world." Resurrection contradicts the idea that death is final. Contrary to the suggestion that contrary evidence weakens belief, theists use the apparent contradiction to natural law not to question theistic belief, but to fortify it. Acting over the objection of natural law is the strongest evidence for omnipotence - if you believe it. If anyone could resurrect at will, that is, if resurrection were compatible with nature, theists would have to look for other evidence of omnipotence. If resurrection does not pass muster as disconfirming evidence, one wonders what does. What is the type of evidence that would be accepted as inconsistent with the god idea? The epistemology of science demands that you specify what it is that according to your theory cannot happen; so when it does happen, you will agree that your theory is false. As for contradictory theological ideas, I am still wondering how the notions of omnipotence and benevolence are to be reconciled. In other words, I am waiting for a compelling answer to Job. A god that, talking out of a cloud, says that there are no contradictons because he says so, is epistemologically weak; it is not the kind of god that Barrett can use to make his case for scientific respectability. .

Barrett: I said, "perhaps god designed us in a such a way that it is by virtue of those processes that we have knowledge of him." If this were an argument for God, I wouldn't think much of it either. Rather, it was merely showing that the (apparent) fact that people are naturally disposed to believe in some kind of god isn't surprising from at least some theological perspectives.

Krueger: Indeed, it isn't surprising from at least some theological perspectives that people are naturally disposed to believe in some kind of god. What are the theological perspectives that consider religious belief unnatural? Perhaps this is a discussion for theologians. There is no psychological point here.

Barrett: Suppose a cognitive scientist challenges your belief that other people have consciousness, beliefs, desires, and other mental states. In short, the cognitive scientist says you are not justified in believing in other minds.

Krueger: This already happened. Behaviorists used to say that "you are not justified in believing in other minds."

Barrett: You don't have any direct empirical evidence that others have minds. At best you have (or think you have) your own mental states and suppose that others must be like you, but that is about as good as it gets.

Krueger: And this is pretty good indeed. As we are all doing this, the assumption of other minds must be an illusion for all of us or for no one. If it is an illusion for all of us, there are no minds at all, and thus no mind that can be the victim of an illusion, and thus no illusion. If, however, the assumption of other minds is an illusion for no one, then, well, there is no illusion either. I conclude that the claim that there are no other minds is self-contradictory, and therefore reject it. Stated differently, we cannot say that the idea of other minds is an illusion for all of us. If it takes a mind to have an illusion it is logically impossible for everyone to falsely believe that others have minds. Alternatively, why should the idea of other minds only be an illusion for some of us or one of us? If solipsism is true, I wonder who the one person is whose mind is so illuded. Is it me, Dr. Barrett, or you, dear reader?

Barrett: You believe others have minds because it just seems to be the case. Your cognitive faculties present such an idea to you automatically.

Krueger: That is only my first impression. My justification (see above) for hanging on to this impression is that to reject it would be self-contradictory.

Barrett: I argue (as has Alvin Plantinga) that something analogous is going on here with some (but not all) religious beliefs.

Krueger: Analogies are suggestive at best. What is the analogy here? If the idea that others have minds comes from the mental simulation and projection of our own minds onto them, then the analogy would be that we simulate the god idea from our experience with our own consciousness. This is psychologically interesting but theologically fatal. It recalls Ludwig Feuerbach and Plato: If donkeys had gods, they would look like donkeys. If however, the analogy is reduced to the fact that both, the idea of other minds and the idea of god, come easy and intuitively, then we are back to the anything-goes philosophy. Beliefs are cheap if you need no justification.