Once we question guilt and regret, we need to consider shame. Like guilt and regret, shame is a moral emotion, and our impulse is to say that as a moral emotion shame must ultimately and essentially be good. Yet, the experience of shame can be excruciating. In the Handbook of Emotions Michael Lewis (1993) considers shame a "global attack on the self-system" and Jungian friend of mine calls shame more colorfully "a soul eating emotion."

So here's a conflict. How do we justify an experience that is so aversive? One attempt to justify it is to look to the role of time. In the short term, shame may feel bad, but in the long term it leads to mended ways, reconciliation, acceptance by others, and so forth. A related attempt says that while shame is painful to the individual experiencing it, it is good for the group, especially injured parties. Both attempts stress the role of shame as a corrective, as a way to get repair and restitution under way. Both attempts must assume -- I assume -- that there is no other way. Painful emotions should be tolerated only if milder forms of motivating experiences have failed. These attempted justifications are the same that one finds for guilt and regret.

Why do we feel shame at all? Why aren't guilt and regret enough? According to Helen Lewis (1971), shame cuts deeper. Whereas guilt is triggered by (regretted) actions, shame is triggered by how an action, a state, or a character trait reflects on the person's essential being. In other words, guilt is about agency, whereas shame is about essence. In Genesis, humans are introduced to shame by self-conscious nakedness, by being even more naked than non-human animals are (no fur, feathers, or scales). Adam and Eve had already sinned by eating the Macintosh, but they did not feel guilty about that transgression yet. Shame came first. Ouch! As shame cuts deeper to our personal core, it must be harder to eradicate than guilt . . . and easier to instill in small children.

Ask yourself: If guilt and shame are moral emotions that are ultimately good, and if, therefore, they may be used on others to help them mend their ways, to their own (and your) good, will you not use them on your children? I think one can argue that making children feel guilty or ashamed is cruel. By what calculus is it worth it? You would not try to dissuade your dog from peeing on the Persian rug by shaming him into taking it outside, or would you? Shaming a child is a back-handed compliment. The child is evolved enough to experience an emotional state that is more painful than a slap on the wrist. If we agree that inducing shame in small children is wrong, then must we not agree that inducing shame in adults has no justification either? Nietzsche thought so and deduced that not shaming another person is the most humane position to take.

(Confession: When I discovered that my post "Why I don't believe in precognition" was plagiarized by a French blogger, I left a cease-and-desist note as a commentary, saying "Shame on you!" By the way, it did not work.).

While I feebly attempt to smack down shame, psychological research is making progress toward a better understanding of this strange emotion. Ronnie Janoff-Bulman and her team have developed and tested a model that ties guilt and shame to two separate motivational systems of approach and avoidance, respectively (Sheik & Janoff-Bulman, 2010). According to their model, guilt is triggered by failing to approach the good (i.e., failing to satisfy a prescriptive demand [You did not call your mother!]), whereas shame is triggered by failing to resist a temptation to do the bad (i.e., failing to meet a proscriptive demand [Thou shalt not masturbate!]). This model is somewhat at variance with Lewis's classic alignment of guilt with action and shame with being, but the data are compelling.

In my resistance to shame, I return to my general objections to free will and responsibility. Following Nietzsche, Strawson the Younger (1994) presents a "basic argument" (his term) against personal responsibility as a syllogism. It runs like this: Premise 1: Nothing can be a cause that is not itself caused. Premise 2: In order to be truly morally responsible, you would have to be such an original cause. Conclusion: You cannot be fully responsible. Paraphrasing himself, Strawson then restates the syllogism in "loose" terms. "You do what you do because of the way you are." Therefore you can be morally responsible only if you are "truly responsible for the way you are" (p. 13). This can't work without raising a problem of infinite regress. If there is a higher-order "you" that is responsible for your first-order you, who is responsible for that higher-order you? It's yous all the way up.

Feeling shame, you have accepted the idea that you can be somehow held accountable for who you are; otherwise you would not feel it. If I were psychoanalytically inclined (which I am only on Wednesdays), I would say that, ironically, the experience of shame is a signs of narcissism. But suggesting that would be adding insult to injury, and it's enough already.

The cure for shame is not high self-esteem (overstudied), but self-acceptance (understudied).

Some free associations to ponder:

[1] Why is the law focused on guilt and not shame, if guilt is about not doing the good and shame is about doing the bad? Can we be assumed shameless until found shameful?

[2] You may have tried (and succeeded) to guilt or shame someone into doing your bidding, but have you ever charged "Guilt on you!"

[3] Researchers have begun to explore the phenomenology of "collective guilt." I think studies on "collective shame" should be next, especially if shame comes from breaching proscriptive norms. What about "survivor's shame" or a distinction between "Catholic and Jewish shame?"

[4] Darwin (1872) noticed the connection between blushing and shame. Yet, shame can be deliciously ambivalent. The blushing bride, I assume, is not experiencing the excruciating emotion I have described above. Perhaps there is a redeeming quality in shame after all.

[5] We need a theory linking shame to power(lessness). If Nietzsche observes that not shaming someone is the highest sign of humanity, then shaming someone is an abuse of power. In psychology, interpersonal power is usually seen as the power to control someone's outcomes, that is, the ability to provide or withhold tangibles. The ability to get others to victimize themselves is a more powerful lever indeed. One wonders what type of person is seduced by that type of power trip.

[6] And finally: What is Karl-Theodor Freiherr von und zu Guttenberg feeling (see photo on top)? The Count, German Secretary of Defense, and Juris Doctor (University of Wagnertown at Bayreuth, 2006) allegedly lifted portions of his dissertation. The good doctor denies it. My line of argument implies that he should not feel shame, but that does not sit well. Once again, my emotions spite my carefully derived conclusions.

References

Darwin, C. (1872). The expression of the emotions in man and animals. London: John Murray.

Lewis, H. N. (1971). Shame and guilt in neurosis. New York: International University Press.