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Highly Sensitive Person

When it Comes to Trusting Authority, Moral Conviction and Religiosity Part Ways

Religiosity and conviction are not always simpatico, despite what many think

One of the consistent themes in political discussions is the influence of religious belief on attitudes toward government. Typically it's assumed that a high degree of religiosity is synonymous with a high degree of moral conviction -- they're popularly thought to go hand-in-hand. So, if someone's attitude toward governmental authority is influenced by his or her religiosity, it should logically follow that this attitude is further buttressed by his or her moral conviction; the influence should be the same.

But is that true?

A study published in the journal Psychological Science sought to find out how religiosity and moral conviction influence attitudes toward authority. A survey was administered to a representative sample of 727 Americans, ages 19-90, to asses the degree of trust or mistrust people have in major decisions made by the Supreme Court (in this case, physician assisted suicide, a.k.a 'PAS'). The sample drew from a wide socioeconomic and educational background.

The survey tested several areas, including:

* Support or opposition to PAS
* Level of strength or weakness of support or opposition (to gauge attitude extremity)
* Overall level of moral conviction
* Trust in Supreme Court to make decisions regarding PAS
* Length of time it takes to give an opinion on level of trust in Supreme Court (to reveal the degree of visceral emotion linked to this opinion; more emotion = less time)
* Level of overall religiosity

Here's what researchers found: First, the stronger a person's moral conviction, the less they trust the Supreme Court to make a judgment about PAS. Conversely, the higher the degree of their religiosity, the MORE people trust the Supreme Court to make a decision on this sensitive issue.

Just to be clear about that -- the results for moral conviction were exactly the opposite of those for religiosity.

Also, the stronger a person's moral conviction, the faster they responded to the trust question, indicating a visceral reaction as opposed to a more considered one. Likewise, the higher the degree of someone's religiosity, the faster they responded to the trust question. So in the case of both moral conviction and religiosity, responses were significantly visceral.

At least two major implications can be drawn out from this study. The first is that the typical assumption that religiosity and moral conviction are necessarily synonymous is false. Moral conviction in this study was strongly linked to distrust in legitimate authority, while religiosity was strongly linked to trust in legitimate authority.

The second implication is that morally convicted people don't merely "react" to decisions with which they don't agree. Instead, it's clear that they don't trust legitimate authorities to make the right decisions in the first place. Their reaction is simply a projection of a predisposition already strongly held.

When I first read this study, I felt that the one crucial area it didn't tease out fully enough is where religiosity and moral conviction overlap. Presumably, level of moral conviction would trump level of religiosity on attitudes toward authority (at least it certainly seems this way) -- but it's also possible that religiosity has a moderating effect on moral conviction's influence in some cases.

I contacted Dr. Linda Skitka, one of the authors of this study, and she provided an answer to my question:

We did test whether religiosity moderated the effects of moral conviction, and it did not--in other words, the effects of moral conviction on trust in the Supreme Court did not change as a function of whether the perceiver was low or high in religiosity. We measured both general religiosity, as well as whether people's feelings about PAS were based on religious convictions, and got the same pattern of results regardless of which way we operationalized "religiousness".

Interestingly (and counter-intuitively), about one-third of those whose attitude about PAS reflected a strong religious conviction did not report that their attitude about PAS was a strong moral conviction.

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