Hot Thought

I attended a brief lecture by Dr.Koch recently. He talked a lot about what we now know about consciousness and summed up at the end by saying 'we dont know much'. Yes, it may eons before we begin to understand the mechanisms.

In his talk, he mentioned that human fetus may not be conscious up until getting ready for birth. Perhaps the key to understanding consciousness will lie in analyzing the birth cycle much closer. That must be really complicated to study , of course.

Thanks for the post.

The fundamental problem with this post is that Mr. Thagard - quite shamefully a chaired professor of Philosophy - fails to ask the first question of epistemology: what constitutes an "explanation"? How can any set of descriptions - for this is what Science is, a set of controlled statements - "account for" something that, ipso facto, produces and evaluates descriptions? Explaining is the art of arranging words in such a way as to quell the practice of questioning, and the practice of questioning originates with standstills in a culture’s exercise of its human interests. These standstills are what cause us to distinguish between our interests & perceptions – Consciousness – and the realities impervious to them: Nature. Science is the practice of systematically mediating between the social constructs of Consciousness and Nature. The empirical system of inquiry does not address reality itself, but only the questions we have allowed to penetrate our level of engagement with reality. Science is therefore a systematic way of exerting the values of Consciousness on what we deem as reality, and a way of shaping and conditioning our perceptions of the same. Therefore, science is both an exercise and determinant of Consciousness and, as such, cannot “explain” something of which it is a part and which it affects.

Insofar as it is a meaningful term, Consciousness must remain implicit and ineffable, while Nature remains explicit and describable. As Consciousness is not explicit, but implicit to our sense of presence and awareness, as it is not objective but vested, as it is not inert but reactive, and as it is not impartial but allegiant and predisposed: it cannot be "explained" with statements. Scientific statements can only refer to things, but consciousness is not a thing: it is a state, a presence, a departure, a practice, an impulse. In order to describe, one must define one's terms: but Consciousness cannot be defined: it is always changing.

In order to be useful, explanations must generalize, but Consciousness cannot be generalized - as it is without a consistent nature or definable limit. What is the word count of an condemned man’s terror before the gun? In order to explain, one must refer to an externality – But external to what? To the language of the explanation. Yet Consciousness is this language: it is what converts printed patterns of ink into image, sense, expectation, projection...i.e. into everything for which language is used and in which it consists. Thus, explanations must refer to things distinct from Consciousness and, as such, cannot explain it.

Consciousness is not the architecture of neural networks and the flow of electrical impulses through an organic circuitry. Our consciousness is the contradicting sense of life - of death, the inorganic, the never alive - and the action and dread of living that correspond to this circuitry. No matter how finely we calibrate the radio scans of all its action potentials, we will never be able to encode in binary (or any other type of code) the sum activity of a brain’s neurons for even a second, esp. not at the subatomic level of its fundamental reality. Even more impossible would be the prospect of connecting the dots between this information and the scans of a separate, additional second, in order to construct a predictive model of the brain’s activity. The necessary device would be larger than the universe itself.

Yet let us suppose, for the sake of argument, this computer’s existence (perhaps in a parallel universe communicates with our own via a mysterious portal). Let us suppose the entirety of a brain's thought and sensation during a discreet period (say, the wavelength of hydrogen times 2 trillion, starting at 60 trillion fermion spins past dawn) could be "represented" with information (specifically, bits of binary code). And let us, for the sake of imperfect convenience, call the thought and sensation of this lucky brain its "Consciousness". We will further suppose that, with all its infinite computational capacity, the super machine could duplicate en exact "representation" of any subsequent period in that brain's consciousness, from the moment of the first measurement sample to its demise.

Given the computer’s vast capacities, we have asked it to call up the state of the brain for a two minute period, two years hence. How would we make use of this supremely thorough depiction? Suppose we could download it to our own brain and experience the explanation firsthand: its skepticism, its titillations, its weariness and sweat? Would we then be engaging with a scientific explanation of Consciousness or rather an example of it? Explanations can never constitute the independent realities they reference, but only direct the practice of referencing such realities.

Even on a physical level, is it not even remotely clear which portion of a brain’s activity, during a given period, corresponds to whatever vague complex of states, proclivities and conceptions is considered to be its “Consciousness”. Every millisecond of agitation severs an axon, every hour of habit reinforces a dendrite, every year of companionship alters the amygdala’s geometry. What about the ions of calcium departing from the axon during its severance? After which millisecond, which hour or year does one examine the brain in relation whatever is perceived as its “Consciousness”? If every brain, on a material level, is in constant flux, then why do certain people still refer to a metaphysical conception of transcendent experiential unity called “Consciousness,” a category seemingly impervious to such changes? If indeed it is conceded that the behavior and quality of this as of yet unobserved entity, Consciousness, is determined by these neurologic perturbations – and even in a strict and regular fashion – which of its many aspects does one consider characteristic, essential, actual? I.e. which characteristics from which period of brain activity are referred to when uttering the word “Consciousness”? And on what basis is such an arbitrary determination made?
If it is made, are there any prescient traits in the collection that are included even when no existing word refers to them? How would one keep track of such unnamed traits so as to recall them in the future?

This is exactly the problem: Consciousness means whatever you want it to mean. It has no objective material content that can be referred to, nor any subjective content that can be agreed upon except in loose, poetic terms. No material reality actually corresponds to Consciousness – even if Consciousness is a material phenomena isolated to the brain. Rather, Consciousness is a continually fluctuating and recomposing set of states, dialogues and dispositions that, like anything, is only referred to with the degree of specificity required by its definition. Its definition is operative, not objective – when we refer to Consciousness, we appropriate and shape the social agreements that allow certain of our experiences to be registered and named, and certain to be either forgotten, repressed or attributed to externalities. Consciousness is then a social construct regulating how we engage with, receive and subjugate the world: it carves out a territory of experiences assigned to entities endowed with subjectivity, volition, agency, and relegates other states to inanimate, material, inert things and fields. As a result, the construct of Consciousness has often been construed to oppress and exploit the disabled, the uneducated and those perceived as primitive or wild, while fueling unchecked extraction and pollution of “inert” natural resources.

The notion that science could “explain” Consciousness is fraught with an unexamined notion of “explanation”. Explanations are, by definition, whatever satisfies the agitations of Consciousness. The rivalries and curiosities that caused us to name a part of our experience “Consciousness” and set it in contrast to the unresponsive and explicit elements of “Nature” reveal that, insofar as it is to remain a useful term, Consciousness can not equated with the concrete externalities of Nature. There can be no sufficient reason for Reason itself.

Very interesting! I think neuroscience will not be able to explain "conciousness" completely because it exceeds physical processes. I think that human beings have a soul (we can call it what we want, but we must not subsume it into matter) and that's why we were able to develop science, language, philosophy. Not because we have a "better" brain than animals, but we have a different component, a "plus", thay animals not have. That's my opinion. Sorry for my English, I'm from Argentina. Thanks for the post and the discussion!

Ya its complicated. Since im epileptic I love these types of stories. One question, if you took my brain out, would you call it " Camilla's brain", or would you call it "Camilla"? if you would call it "Camilla" then thats just gross, Im literally a piece of meat in a skull and I feel that I shouldnt have to follow the norm or society, since I am nothing more then gray matter, I mean how insignificant is that. however "Camilla's brain" makes me think, then where is "Camilla"? where is ME? I come in and out of seizures and "consciousness" plays a big role obviously.

I remember seeing my boyfriend while in a seizure, but not knowing who he is. I remember not knowing what anything is. Then when im waking up from a seizure not remembering anything about myself. Then after a few minutes, Im thinking' my name is Camilla, I'm currently living with my boyfriend and Im trying to apply to school. Oh and im currently on bad terms with my parents." Then i start getting back to where I left off. its horrible, makes u feel soooo insignificant. People take "thinking" for granted. Most people cant even fathom what it would be like to not be able to think, well I can. My biggest fear is ending up a vegetable, seeing people around me but not being able to speak, or remember who they are exactly, just a "feeling", a "feeling" of comfort when i see my boyfriend or my mom, but not knowing who they are. Not knwoing what a door is, or what food is, or WHAT I AM. very disturbing. hell.