Andrew Hinderliter has carried our dialog one step further. HE WRITES:
"In his arguments for diagnostic conservatism, I have largely found Dr. Frances' case compelling given the historical context of DSM-IV: DSM-III was a watershed for psychiatric diagnosis, but people felt that DSM-III-R was too much change too fast.
There was a need for stabilization, and DSM-IV provided this. In light of the very uncertain scientific foundation of psychiatric nosology, this stability helps make data sets easier to compare and promotes communication among clinicians. Where there is great potential of severe unintended consequences, caution is prudent.
However, Dr. Frances' response to my email is primarily an apology for past decisions. Whether wise or foolish, what is done is done, and what must now be addressed is what to do now.
The DSM-IV approach leaves a major problem unaddressed (and almost unaddressable). Psychiatric diagnosis has the most potential of getting into trouble when it pathologizes social deviance and normality. Dr. Frances' many critiques of problematic DSM-5 proposals deal precisely with these issues, but there is no reason to assume a priori that none of the diagnoses already in the DSM suffer from the same problems.
Yet the DSM-IV conservative approach leaves no mechanism for rectifying situations where inappropriate medicalization has already been built into the system. The question is how to preserve the benefits of diagnostic conservatism while creating a mechanism for dealing with this problem?
In terms of avoiding the pathologization of social deviance, certain diagnoses in the DSM are obvious candidates for potential removal from the DSM (or at least need to be taken back to the drawing board). These would include: conduct disorder, antisocial personality disorder, the paraphilias, some of the impulse control disorders, gender identity disorder, and maybe some of the substance use disorders.
Workgroups could be formed to study the specific diagnoses felt to be most deserving of further scrutiny. Their
membership should include people from a wide variety of backgrounds (e.g. the law, ethics, psychiatry history, philosophy, sociology, etc.) and not just psychiatric experts in the relevant subfield.
The next question is what standards should be used. This gets us into the much debated question of how to decide whether a condition is a mental disorder, which I shall make no pretension to answer in the space available here.
Perhaps the biggest problem to be overcome is disentangling mental disorder from (quickly changing) concepts of what is deviant or immoral. Psychiatry has a long history of pathologizing variant sexualities, including ones that are later no longer considered to be immoral or an indication of illness.
In the US, homosexuality is the only variant sexuality to be successfully removed from the DSM. While science did play some role in this decision, as did psychiatrists simply feeling it was the right thing to do, it would have never happened without outside pressure.
The anachronistic quality of the Paraphilia section illustrates the weakness of diagnostic conservatism: standards of morality and tolerance change faster than has the diagnostic system ( at least in the US). In recent years, several of the Scandinavian countries have removed sadomasochism, transvestism, and fetishism from their versions of the ICD. The increasingly tolerant sexual ethics in the US suggests the need for a similar depathologization of sexuality or else DSM 5 will seem quaint and out of date"








