Into this mix, I'll add Karl Marx who said history repeats itself, the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce.

The struggle over raising the debt limit in Washington is certainly farcical, and reminds me of tragic events almost one hundred years ago in a place far away.

Ironically, in both cases the tragic flaw is not a moral failing, but a moral virtue--loyalty to a promise.

A further irony is that in a summer 97-years-ago over the same time frame as our own debt ceiling debate--"default is not an option"--Europe moved inexorably to its own unimaginable end.

On June 28, 1914--about the same date as our default debate got hot--Archduke Franz Ferdinand was assassinated in Sarajevo by a Serb national. During the month of July 1914, "the July Crisis"--we're in our own July crisis--world leaders failed to prevent the guns of August, which lead to a worldwide conflagration with casualties of 17 million dead, and 21 million wounded.

Drawing historical parallels never yields a point to point comparison. There is no obvious single spark today analogous to the Sarajevo assassination that is setting off our plunge into economic default, although you could argue that the Congressional election of 2010 put us on this path. But there is enough similarity to say that in both cases a very bad and undesired result--war or default--was not prevented despite the sincere desire of many--if not all of--the antagonists.

In the immediate aftermath of the assassination, most observers imagined either a local war--i.e., a police action by Austria-Hungary against Serbia--or a negotiated settlement. A New York Times' headline on June 29, 1914 understatedly said, "Tragedy May Alter Politics Of Europe." It spoke of intervention in Serbia, but also suggested that the death of the Archduke, who had been advocating an aggressive approach in the Balkans, could lead to long-term moderation. And the article mentions previous crises in which war was averted by diplomacy. In 1909, Germany threatened to mobilize its army unless Russia agreed to the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but actually worked behind the scenes to moderate against the outbreak of hostilities.

Today, most antagonists in the debt ceiling crises say "default is not an option," but the images of all those reasonable folks sitting around the big conference tables in DC bring to mind those grainy newsreels of 1914 diplomats getting off trains and cocking their hats at the adversaries with whom they would soon be at war.

Historians believe that the interlocking alliances among the European powers--promises kept--could not be overcome by good will and wishes for peace. Germany was treaty bound with Austria-Hungary to support an attack not only on Serbia but on France or Russia, and Russia was pledged to defend Serbia, and Britain would come to the aid of France if attacked. They all held hands and jumped off the cliff together.

Although many--particularly within the British, French, and Russian Entente-- wanted to avoid war, the Russians were determined on protecting their "little Slavic brothers" from the big, bad Austrian wolf. The Austrians had long wanted to pacify the troublesome Balkan Slavs, and their ally, Germany, promised by treaty to support them. Many in the German leadership saw this as opportunity to pacify France--an ally of Serbia's ally Russia--which had remilitarized following its previous humiliation by Germany and loss of Alsace-Lorraine in 1870. The German Chancellor wanted "security for the German Reich in west and east for all imaginable time."

So among both camps there was a spectrum of opinion, from pacific to belligerent.

There are similarities in the debt ceiling debate. Among the Democrats the predominant option wants simply to have a "clean bill" that would raise the limit and avoid the consequences of default and a plunge into a deeper recession, but they are willing--particularly President Obama--to make painful compromises to avoid economic catastrophe. A small number might vote against any compromise. A large number of Democrats have a bottom-line position that they will agree to significant budget cuts as long as they are accompanied by increases in tax revenues--anathema to Republicans who are locked into a no-tax pledge--their big promise.

Some Republicans are like the German chancellor. In their refusal to vote for raising the debt ceiling under any circumstances they hope for an end to the New Deal and a restoration of a weak federal government for "all imaginable time."

On July 23,1914--97 years and one day after John Boehner walked out of a meeting with President Obama--the Austrians presented an ultimatum to Serbia--an ultimatum that would have violated Serbian sovereignty, mandating, for example, that the Serbian military be purged of all anti-Austrian elements. Serbia agreed to much of this, but not all. Their failure to give in totally was an immediate precipitant to the war.

Meanwhile, the British were attempting mediation, trying to get the Germans to moderate Austrian demands, while they implored the Russians to reign in the Serbians.

This was rejected by the German Kaiser as "condescending."

Historians still debate whether the great war could have been prevented, and whether the Germans and the Austrians were using the Sarajevo incident as a pretext for a war they wanted all along. But it's relatively easy to see parallels here with our situation today. The Republican pledge of no new taxation is today's equivalent of a binding World War alliance.

If Russia broke faith with Serbia, there may have been no war at all.

If the British broke faith with the French, then Germany may have won the war, and quickly, and if they had won World War I, there may have been no World War II, and its even greater devastation.

If some Republicans broke their promise of no new taxes, my neighbor's social security check will be in the mail.

Breaking a promise is a profile in courage.

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My book, Nasty, Brutish, and Long: Adventures In Eldercare (Avery/Penguin, 2009), was a Finalist for the 2010 Connecticut Book Award. Click here to read the first chapter It provides a unique, insider's perspective on aging in America. It is an account of my work as a psychologist in nursing homes, the story of caregiving to my frail, elderly parents--all to the accompaniment of ruminations on my own mortality. Thomas Lynch, author of The Undertaking, calls it "A book for policy makers, caregivers, the halt and lame, the upright and unemcumbered: anyone who ever intends to get old."

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